As the Army transitions from its operational missions in Afghanistan and sets the conditions for the Army of 2020, a new strategy for managing forces has been developed that regionally aligns Army forces to Combatant Commanders. Regional Alignment of Forces (RAF) provides for a scalable and tailorable approach in meeting the Combatant Commander's requirements with the expertise and understanding of culture, geography, language, and the operating environment in which Army forces may operate. This paper provides an analysis on the ends, ways, and means through the functional areas of force structure, training and readiness, and funding.
Recommendations are provided that may enable the Army to realize the full potential of RAF. They include ensuring force structure processes are focused on tailorable and scalable formations for both the Active and Reserve component; adapting innovated partnering initiatives within the Army's current bench of experts and interagency to create a solid base of language and cultural experts; and evaluating the Army's current funding process for the operational force.
Strategic Analysis of Regional Alignment of United States Army Forces
The United States and its military forces, often with allies and other interested nations, will remain engaged in complex power struggles worldwide in order to protect national interests. As land forces continue to evolve, they must strive for a balance of soft and hard power capabilities to meet challenges across the spectrum of conflict. Priorities for 21 st Century Defense.
The imperatives listed above create a set of coordinated actions the Army will take to support the mission areas outlined in the President's and Secretary of Defense's strategic guidance. 3 As the Army acts on the imperative to provide a modernized and ready, tailored land force capability to meet the Combatant Commander (CCDR) requirements, seven near-term actions are being implemented and resourced in Fiscal
Year 2014 and 2015 that will shape the Army's warfighting role in 2020. 4 The CSA has about three years remaining to see his vision implemented based on his current tenure. As the force structure actions are implemented, it must be noted these actions, once resourced, take time to provide trained and ready forces prepared to execute the strategy. Normally these changes take about two years in the Active projects can be lengthy, taking as long as seven years from initiating projects to "move in" of units. As the Army staff embarks on this path to implement the RAF strategy, the CSA's vision will be the guiding light in organizing and structuring the Army to meet its requirements for the nation.
The Army is globally engaged and regionally responsive; it is an indispensible partner and provider of a full range of capabilities to Combatant Commanders in a Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multi-national (JIIM) environment. As part of the Joint Force and as America's Army, in all that we offer, we guarantee the agility, versatility and depth to Prevent, Shape, and Win.
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TAA 15-19 will shape a smaller Army sized to defend the United States and have the capability to conduct a broad range of concurrent operations in disparate Theaters.
TAA 15-19 will bring a force design construct consisting of steady-state Army activities while supporting multiple overlapping contingency operations and building capacity to implement the RAF strategy. 14 In addition to the implementation of the RAF strategy, the Army will have to prepare to provide the capability and capacity to support the ten Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) mission areas. Two critical aspects are: 1)
continuing to contribute to global security and rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region Based on these number of BCTs and the pending ARFORGEN requirements, there can be 10 to 12 BCTs in the available force pool on any given year to regionally align a unit to a Combatant Command. 17 It is important to note that the regional alignment of forces is not restrictive to BCTs. The regional alignment also includes: The Total Army Force (AC/RC/NG), enabler brigades such as fires and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, institutional organizations that include DoD Civilians and contractors, and the concept of aligning conventional forces to Special Operations Forces (SOF) missions.
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In analyzing the above force structure choices leading to an effective strategy of regionally aligning Army forces, the Army is currently making the right decisions to significantly enhance the implementation of this strategy. The RAF strategy allows for the AC and RC rotational force flow adding predictable and dependable use of forces to meet the CCMD requirements. The current force structure capacity can align at least one Corps or Division Headquarters to support each CCMD for planning and executing theater shaping activities. Also, the current force structure mix allows for tailorable and scalable formations for varying degrees of operational duration. The current fiscal 9 environment is forcing the Army to take a detailed look at its force structure to maintain relevance to the Joint Force using reduced resources.
Several challenges have surfaced through this analysis that should be noted.
RAF forces need more planning, training, and coordination to conduct missions in theater than forces assigned permanently to a CCMD. Army input to the CCMD is essential in managing RAF forces. Also managing the requirements across the ARFORGEN pools to support steady state missions and surge events can impact the Army's ability to meet operational requirements. The fundamental training characteristic for the future of Army forces to provide decisive land power is operational adaptability. At all levels throughout the training model, from individual soldier skills through collective brigade operations, a training effect that allows Army leaders, Soldiers, and Civilians to shape conditions and respond effectively to a broad range of missions and changing threats must be established. 23 Preparing units aligned to a CCMD will utilize a balanced training approach in achieving and sustaining readiness. The expectation is that unit alignment to a CCMD will occur in the available phase of its ARFORGEN Cycle. Units are expected to be rated as C1 in readiness throughout the Available Phase. 24 Manning and equipping strategies must be adjusted to allow RC forces the requisite priority in attaining the required training standards as they enter the "available"
phase. Units aligned to the RAF strategy must be provided the time to adequately address the requirements of the CCMD. It is imperative that a thorough understanding of CCMD requirements is achieved before entering the "training" phase of the ARFORGEN model. This understanding allows the unit to construct a detailed training plan to maintain proficiency in all individual and collective tasks meeting the CCMD requirements as the unit enters the available phase.
Analysis of Costs (Means)
As the Army proceeds with the RAF strategy, a cost informed approach must be used. The costs for implementing this strategy may be substantial and could put the Army at significant risk in accomplishing its operational requirements in support of the Joint Force. This cost informed approach guides Army senior leadership on a path to understanding how funding will impact the RAF strategy and allowing the best decisions to be made ensuring the strategy's success. As stated in the Department of the Army Execution Order for RAF:
At a time of fiscal austerity, balancing this requirement against an ever reducing budget will require stringent oversight. It is therefore imperative that the full cost of implementing the regional alignment of Forces is understood as quickly as possible. While most of the training costs will be covered through current and planned Army Operations and Maintenance dollars, and most of the employment costs will be covered by CCMD Security Cooperation (SC) funds (both Title 10 and 22), there may be some additional costs, significantly transportation costs, that require planning and programming. 27 The CSA has reiterated that innovative ways of funding the RAF strategy must be developed across the board to accomplish this task. As a part of the strategy formulation, RAF must have a "means" balanced approach. This approach ensures that the Army's resources are tightly integrated into the "ways" in which we attain our strategy's "ends." The Army's total obligation authority (TOA) is not growing and funding to support RAF will come from the Army's TOA and the CCMD's ability to exercise the available funding within their Theater Security Cooperation and Host Nation funding capacity. 28 Additional facts that provide cause for concern in conducting a RAF cost informed analysis is that there are no proposed changes to current equipping and manning policies. Priority for manning and equipping for the global employment of the force will still go to those forces aligned to the operational mission pool within the ARFORGEN model. RAF forces should not exceed their authorized level of equipment.
A thorough equipping analysis, of each unit distributed to RAF, would need to be conducted to determine if authorized levels of equipment meet specific regional requirements.
The RAF strategy, if implemented as designed, may create increased costs that will need to be covered above and beyond normal unit METL training as past training models have utilized. These requirements will have to compete along with other training needs and established priorities of those units in the global force pool that have been identified for specific or contingency operations. Significant costs will go to cultural and language training to meet the baseline requirements for RAF. The Army must conduct an informed approach to meet the baseline training requirements for RAF. Building force structure into units that provides this type of training will create growth or take from other critical capabilities of an already over-tasked organization. The Army should utilize its available language and cultural subject matter experts to establish the training cadre rather than building new organizations to conduct training as has been done in the past.
Creating teams of cadre from civil affairs and language specialties across the Army may provide a simple way to reduce RAF costs.
Modernization can be costly in terms of equipment and training. The Army needs to evaluate how it modernizes its forces. Business as usual procedures across the modernization community cannot be conducted as is the past. The following recommendations may provide HQDA cost savings to allow for the implementation of RAF:
 Evaluate the use of Army prepositioned equipment vice transporting unit equipment from home station for deployment into CCMD AOR.
 Evaluate the potential of slowing down the modernization of units as they proceed through the ARFORGEN cycle.
 Utilize current subject matter experts in the fields of cultural awareness and language abilities that reside in DoD rather than create new manning requirements. In addition, evaluate the use of DoS personnel and training methods.
 Evaluate current Army budgeting models to ensure RAF is properly included into funding plans for operations, maintenance, and training.
Summary
Key to the success of this RAF strategy will be to fully develop a force through the complex processes that build the Army of 2020 focused on force structure, training and readiness, and costs to sustain this strategy. The current shaping process the Army is utilizing provides a force that is scalable, tailorable and adaptable to meet the future operational environment. The Army needs to maintain current training strategies and adapt innovated partnering initiatives with other government agencies to create a solid base of language and cultural experts. The ARFORGEN model must be adjusted to meet the requirements of RAF from a Total Force perspective. The Army should evaluate the current funding process for its operational forces to better support RAF implementation. Additional costs, above and beyond current O&M accounts, may be required to cover operations, training, and maintenance in support of RAF. Addressing these recommendations may enhance RAF implementation in these times of budget austerity.
RAF leverages the strengths of our highly trained soldiers coupled with capabilities that are unmatched in the world today in meeting CCDR requirements as a first choice solution for regional challenges. 29 The recent publication of the 2013 Army Strategic Planning Guidance (ASPG), in February 2013, is a continuation of the 2012 ASPG edition in that it refines the current Army vision while focusing on balancing longterm force structure actions with near-term fiscal constraints. 30 The RAF strategy provides the critical component to implement this strategic guidance in a volatile and uncertain world.
Landpower is not just about combat capability and warfighting. It's about shaping the environment and influencing people to do what you want them to do. The RAF 20 strategy assists in shaping the theaters and influencing our partners. By balancing the ways through force structure, training and readiness; and the "means" of finite resources of personnel and equipment the Army can attain the strategic ends it desires of a mission-tailored regional force.
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